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China1. Introduction
Problems of information asymmetry between management and ﬁnancial institutions, and agency conﬂicts between controlling
shareholders and minority investors, as well as between management and shareholders have been found to signiﬁcantly inﬂuence
ﬁrms' investment decisions (Abhyankar et al., 2005; Fazzari et al., 1988; Jensen, 1986; Jiang et al., 2010; Myers and Majluf, 1984).
These problems are particularly severe in emerging markets. Given the signiﬁcant capital market imperfections characterizing it
and its poor corporate governance mechanisms (Allen et al., 2005), the Chinese setting provides an ideal laboratory to study
ﬁrms' investment decisions in the presence of both ﬁnancial constraints and agency problems.1lia), junhong.yang@shefﬁeld.ac.uk (J. Yang).
fer to agency costs as those deadweight losses, which, in the presence of asymmetric information, prevent to
rs and lenders. These agency costs translate themselves in a higher cost of externalﬁnance compared to internal
ts, and only consider as agency problems those arising from conﬂicts of interest betweenmajority shareholders
hareholders.
.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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development and economic growth (Levine, 2005). Its under-developed ﬁnancial system is in fact seriously out of step with its
thriving growth (Allen et al., 2005).2 Internal ﬁnance, trade credit, and other informal funds might speak louder than bank or eq-
uity ﬁnance in explaining the Chinese growth miracle. In other words, the role of China's external markets in ﬁnancing and allo-
cating resources has been limited.
This is due, ﬁrst of all, to the fact that dominant state-owned banks are not efﬁcient since they have plenty of nonperforming
loans (NPLs). More importantly, they need to support massive unproﬁtable state-owned enterprises (SOEs). It is consequently
difﬁcult for private ﬁrms to access external funding (Allen et al., 2005; Guariglia et al., 2011; Héricourt and Poncet, 2009). Sec-
ond, although it has grown in recent years, the Chinese stock market is still relatively small compared with the banking sector.
Due to poor regulation and to the fact that a substantial number of listed ﬁrms are controlled by the state, the stock market is
not very efﬁcient and stock prices do not reﬂect fundamental values (Allen et al., 2005; Wang et al., 2009). Financial markets in
China have therefore not been playing a very efﬁcient role in allocating resources and relieving ﬁnancial constraints, which are
a signiﬁcant issue for several Chinese ﬁrms, and may lead them to under-invest.3
At the same time, given the weak legal system and poor corporate governance mechanisms that characterize the country,
agency problems are rather severe and likely to lead to over-investment in China's listed sector (Allen et al., 2005; Chen et al.,
2011). For instance, government bureaucrats may use their inﬂuence to over-invest in order to achieve their political objectives
(Firth et al., 2012). These effects may be ampliﬁed by the presence of soft budget constraints,4 and widespread corruption
(Chow et al., 2010; Firth et al., 2012). Excessive investment might cause over-heating and over-capacity, and generate inefﬁciency,
which could impair the sustainable development and future wellbeing in China.
Our work makes three main contributions to the literature. First, we examine under- and over-investment at the same time, as
we believe that these two types of abnormal investment are likely to coexist in China. Second, unlike most prior research, which
examines sensitivities of investment to cash ﬂow (Cleary, 1999; Cummins et al., 2006; Fazzari et al., 1988; Kaplan and Zingales,
1997), we focus on the sensitivity of abnormal investment to free cash ﬂow. By deducting required (maintenance) and expected
investment from capital expenditure, and removing mandated components from cash ﬂow, this approach prevents free cash ﬂow
from picking up future investment opportunities. Consequently, in the absence of ﬁnancing constraints and agency costs, under-
and over-investment should not display a systematic response to free cash ﬂow. Our approach provides therefore a powerful and
unambiguous test which will help shed light on whether investment inefﬁciencies in the unique Chinese context can be explained
by ﬁnancial constraints and/or agency problems. Third, our analysis provides evidence on the extent to which heterogeneity in the
degree of ﬁnancing constraints and agency costs faced by ﬁrms affects the sensitivities of under- and over-investment to free cash
ﬂow.
Our study is conducted using a large panel of listed Chinese ﬁrms over the period 1998–2014. We analyze the sensitivity of
(under- and over-) investment to free cash ﬂow across groups of ﬁrms sorted according to different characteristics. In doing
so, we adopt the framework proposed by Richardson (2006) to construct ﬁrm-level under- and over-investment and free cash
ﬂow measures. Our empirical results show that a combination of both ﬁnancing constraints and agency problems explains invest-
ment inefﬁciency in the unique Chinese context. In particular, our ﬁndings are consistent with the ﬁnancial constraints hypothesis
(Fazzari et al., 1988): higher sensitivities of under-investment to free cash ﬂow are found for the ﬁrms with cash ﬂow below their
optimal level, which are more likely to face ﬁnancing constraints. Our results are also in line with the agency costs hypothesis
(Jensen, 1986): higher sensitivities of over-investment to free cash ﬂow are spotted in ﬁrms with cash ﬂow above their optimal
levels, which are more likely to suffer from agency problems. These results are robust to the use of alternative measures of abnor-
mal investment and free cash ﬂow, of different estimation methodologies, and of various alternative criteria to deﬁne ﬁnancial
constraints and agency costs.
The remainder of the paper is laid out as follows. Section 2 develops testable hypotheses regarding ﬁrms' investment behavior
and its relationship with ﬁnancial constraints and agency problems. Section 3 illustrates the methodology we use to measure ab-
normal investment and free cash ﬂow. Section 4 presents our baseline speciﬁcations and estimation methodology. Section 5 de-
scribes the main features of the data and presents summary statistics. Section 6 discusses and examines our main empirical results
and some robustness tests. Section 7 analyzes the extent to which heterogeneity in the degree of ﬁnancing constraints and agency
costs faced by ﬁrms affects the sensitivities of under- and over-investment to free cash ﬂow. Section 8 concludes.
2. Development of hypotheses
In a perfect and complete capital market, investment decisions are not affected by the way ﬁrms ﬁnance themselves
(Modigliani and Miller, 1958), suggesting that in order to maximize their value, ﬁrms will implement investment projects until2 According to the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) Statistical Yearbook of China (various issues), China has experienced a rapid growth rate, which reached an
average of 13.2% per year over the 1998–2014 period in terms of GDP (gross domestic product). This incredibly fast growth relied heavily on investment. Over the pe-
riod 1998–2014, the country experienced in fact an investment boom (the average annual growth rate for total ﬁxed investment was 19.7%), whichwas responsible for
around 50% of GDP growth (NBS Statistical Yearbook of China, various issues).
3 Hereafter,wedeﬁneover-investment (under-investment) as investment expenditure beyond (below) its optimal level.We therefore refer to both under- and over-
investment as abnormal investment. In addition, we argue that the sensitivity of abnormal investment to free cash ﬂow can be seen as evidence of investment inefﬁ-
ciency due to ﬁnancial constraints and/or agency problems. It should be noted that there are other ways to measure investment inefﬁciency: for instance, Chen et al.
(forthcoming) focus on the sensitivity of investment expenditure to Tobin's Q.
4 In the presence of soft budget constraints, state-owned enterprises are in fact always bailed out even if they suffer from chronic losses.
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positive correlation between cash ﬂow and investment expenditure (Bond and Van Reenen, 2007; Cleary, 1999; Cumming
et al., 2006; Fazzari et al., 1988; Hubbard, 1998). The reason for the existence of this positive relation remains, however,
controversial.
First, there exists considerable evidence to suggest that the positive correlation between investment and cash ﬂow stems
from asymmetric information between corporate insiders and outside creditors (Carpenter and Guariglia, 2008; Fazzari
et al., 1988; Myers and Majluf, 1984). This can be explained considering that when external ﬁnance such as bank loans, debt
and equity are used, the imperfections in capital markets lead to a cost premium. The cost and/or availability of external
funds force ﬁrms to use internal ﬁnance, like retained earnings, in preference to external ﬁnance. In these circumstances, ﬁnan-
cially constrained ﬁrms may have to forego good investment projects to avoid the excessively high cost premiums associated
with the use of external ﬁnance. Thus, when ﬁrms face ﬁnancial constraints, negative cash ﬂow shocks may lead to under-
investment. A high sensitivity of under-investment to free cash ﬂow can therefore be seen as evidence of ﬁnancial constraints.
We refer to this as the ﬁnancing constraints (FC) hypothesis (H1):
H1. Financing Constraints (FC) Hypothesis: Firms which are ex-ante more likely to face ﬁnancing constraints exhibit higher sen-
sitivities of under-investment to free cash ﬂow.
Second, the positive correlation between investment and cash ﬂow may reﬂect two types of agency problems: those between
controlling shareholder and minority investors, and those between managers and shareholders (Jensen, 1986; Pawlina and
Renneboog, 2005; Stulz, 1990). In the Chinese context, given the weak legal system, the high restriction of share trading, and
the prevalence of dominant shareholders, the ﬁrst type of agency problems has been found to be prevalent (Jiang et al., 2010;
Liu and Lu, 2007). The risk of controlling shareholders expropriating resources from minority investors (tunneling) is in fact se-
vere. As a result, controlling shareholders are likely to make self-interested and entrenched decisions and prefer to spend the
ﬁrm's free cash ﬂow on unproﬁtable projects rather than paying dividends to shareholders, resulting in over-investment. In sum-
mary, when ﬁrms face agency problems (and in particular are more likely to be subject to tunneling), the more free cash ﬂow
they have, the more they prefer to invest, which could lead to over-investment. A positive relationship between over-
investment and free cash ﬂow can hence be interpreted as evidence of the presence of agency problems. We refer to this as
the agency costs (AC) hypothesis (H2):
H2. Agency Cost (AC) Hypothesis: Firms which are ex-ante more likely to face agency problems exhibit higher sensitivities of
over-investment to free cash ﬂow.
Taken together, ﬁnancial constraints and agency problems can prevent ﬁrms from making optimal investment decisions. In
other words, both ﬁnancial constraints and agency problems may increase the sensitivity of investment expenditure to free
cash ﬂow and induce investment inefﬁciency. To discriminate between these two scenarios within the Chinese context, we
test hypotheses H1 and H2. Both hypotheses are focused on the sensitivity of abnormal investment to free cash ﬂow, which
is deﬁned as the cash ﬂow beyond what is required to maintain assets and ﬁnance expected new investments (Richardson,
2006). In the two sections that follow, we outline the methodology that we adopt to test these two hypotheses.I_totali,t
I_newi,t
Ie_newi,t
Fitted value
Iu_newi,t
Residuals
Over-
investment (+)
Under-
investment (-)I_main.i,t
CFOi,t
FCFi,t (+,-) I_main.i,t Ie_newi,t
Fig. 1. Framework for the construction of (under- or over-) investment and free cash ﬂow.
Note: I_totali,t = CAPEXi,t − SalePPEi,t (Capital expenditure — sale of property, plant, and equipment); I_main.i,t = Depreciationi,t + Amortizationi,t; I_newi,t = I_totali,t
− I_main.i,t; CFOi,t = Net cash ﬂow from operating activities; CFAIP,i,t = Cash ﬂow generated from assets in place; FCFi,t = CFAIP,i,t − Ie_newi,t = CFOi,t − I_main.i,t −
Ie_newi,t.
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3.1. A framework to measure abnormal investment and free cash ﬂow
We measure both under- and over-investment (abnormal investment) and free cash ﬂow (FCF) using Richardson's (2006)
accounting-based framework. Fig. 1 outlines our methodology.
Total investment (I_totali,t) is deﬁned as capital expenditure less receipts from the sale of property, plant, and equipment.5
I_totali,t can be decomposed into two main parts: new investment expenditure (I_newi,t), and required investment expenditure
to maintain assets in place (I_main.i,t), which is given by the sum of amortization and depreciation.
New investment expenditure (I_newi,t) can be further split into two components: expected investment expenditure in new
positive net present value (NPV) projects (Ie_newi,t), which is described in the next sub-section, and unexpected investment or
abnormal investment (under- or over-investment, Iu_newi,t).
We then deﬁne ﬁrms' optimal level of cash ﬂow as the sum of maintenance investment (I_main.i,t) and expected investment
expenditure (Ie_newi,t). Free cash ﬂow (FCF) is computed by subtracting the optimal level of cash ﬂow (I_main.i,t + Ie_newi,t) from
net cash ﬂow from operating activities (CFO).6 Accordingly, FCF can be either positive or negative, depending on whether net cash
ﬂow from operating activities (CFO) exceeds the optimal level of cash ﬂow.3.2. Dynamic expectation models of investment expenditure
Following Richardson (2006), a dynamic investment expectation model is used to predict the expected investment expendi-
ture in new positive NPV projects (Ie_newi,t), which can be interpreted as the optimal level of investment expenditure.7 Speciﬁ-
cally, denoting with I_new the ﬁrm's new investment expenditure; with Q (Tobin's Q), its market-to-book ratio8; with Cash, its
ratio of cash and cash equivalents to total assets; with Size, the natural logarithm of its total assets; with Age, the number of
years elapsed since its listing; with ROA, its return on assets9; and with Leverage, the ratio of its short-term and long-term debt
to total assets, we estimate the following equation:5 It sh
to use a
ment (H
free cas
6 The
constrai
7 All i
8 The
sum of t
were ro
Chinese
9 As ﬁ
return o
10 All oI newi;t ¼ a0 þ a1I newi;t−1 þ a2Cashi;t−1 þ a3Qi;t−1 þ a4Sizei;t−1 þ a5Agei;t−1
þ a6ROAi;t−1 þ a7Leveragei;t−1 þ vi þ vt þ vj þ vp þ vj;t þ εi;t ð1Þwhere the subscript i indexes ﬁrms; t indexes years (t = 1998–2014); j, industries; and p, provinces. We use a dynamic model to
allow for a partial adjustment mechanism and to control for unobserved factors not included among other regressors. We lag all
our independent variables (except Age) to alleviate the simultaneity issue (Duchin et al., 2010; Polk and Sapienza, 2009).
The error term in Eq. (1) is made up of ﬁve components. vi is a ﬁrm-speciﬁc effect; vt, a time-speciﬁc effect, which we control
for by including time dummies capturing business cycle effects; vj, an industry-speciﬁc effect, which we take into account by in-
cluding industry dummies; vp, a province-speciﬁc effect capturing uneven developments across different provinces, which we
control for by including province dummies; and vj,t takes into account industry-speciﬁc business cycles, which we control by in-
cluding industry dummies interacted with time dummies. Finally, εi,t is an idiosyncratic component.
Estimates of Eq. (1) obtained using the ﬁxed-effects estimator (Fe) and the system GMM estimator (Blundell and Bond, 1998)
are presented and discussed in Appendix A. The ﬁtted values of Eq. (1) can be interpreted as a proxy for optimal investment
(Ie_newi,t).10 The difference between real investment and optimal investment (Iu_newi,t) is then computed and interpreted as un-
expected investment. Iu_newi,t can be either positive or negative, corresponding to over-investment or under-investment,
respectively.
We next test whether there exists a statistically signiﬁcant relationship between abnormal investment and FCF and, if it does,
whether it stems from ﬁnancing constraints and/or agency costs.ould be noted that Richardson (2006) also includes acquisitions and Research andDevelopment (R&D) expenditure in his proxy for total investment.We chose
more parsimonious proxy for two reasons. The ﬁrst is that capital expenditure is generally used in the ﬁnance and economics literatures as a proxy for invest-
ubbard, 1998). The second is that R&Dexpenditure is not available in our data. Contrary to us, Richardson (2006) also includes R&D expenditure in his proxy for
h ﬂow.
reasonwhywe deduct expected investment expenditure (Ie_newi,t) rather than actual CAPEX to calculate FCF is that actual CAPEX can be inﬂuenced by ﬁnancial
nts or agency costs.
nvestment expenditure variables are scaled by total assets.
shares of listedﬁrms inChina can be either tradable or non-tradable. Following the literature (Chen et al., 2011;Huang et al., 2011),we calculate Tobin'sQ as the
hemarket value of tradable stocks, the book value of non-tradable stocks, and themarket value of net debt divided by the book value of total assets. Our results
bust to using the growth of real sales instead of Tobin'sQ to proxy for investment opportunities (Konings et al.,2003). This test ismotivated by the fact that in the
context, Tobin's Qmay be an imperfect measure of investment opportunities.
rms in a less developedmarket may not make investment decisions based onmarket valuation (Wang et al., 2009), contrary to Richardson (2006), we use the
n assets (ROA) instead of stock returns in our dynamic investment model. See Appendix A for complete deﬁnitions of all variables.
ur results were robust to estimating a more parsimonious version of Eq. (1) only including lagged investment, Q, and the dummies.
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4.1. Main speciﬁcation
To analyze the sensitivities of under- or over-investment to free cash ﬂow, we initially estimate the following regression:11 Bec
free cas
Eqs. (2)
12 It is
more pr
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they can
15 See
allowinIu newi;t ¼ a0 þ a1DumFC F N0 þ a2 FC Fi;t  DumFC Fb0 þ a3 FC Fi;t  DumFC F N0 þ vi þ vt þ εi;t ð2ÞWe partition ﬁrm–years into those characterized by over-investment or under-investment on the basis of their Iu_newi,t. More
speciﬁcally, over-investing (under-investing) ﬁrms are those who have positive (negative) abnormal investment (Iu_newi,t). We
then investigate whether the sensitivity of Iu_newi,t to FCF differs for ﬁrms facing positive and negative FCF, whereby the former
are more likely to be affected by agency problems, while the latter are more likely to suffer from ﬁnancing constraints.11 To this
end, we interact FCF with the dummy DumFCF N 0 (DumFCF b 0), which is equal to 1 if the ﬁrm has positive (negative) free cash
ﬂow, and 0 otherwise. In accordance with the ﬁnancing constraints hypothesis (H1), we expect a2 to be positive and precisely
determined for under-investing ﬁrms, while, in line with the agency costs hypothesis (H2), a3 should be positive and signiﬁcant
for over-investing ﬁrms.12 We also include the dummy DumFCF N 0 in the regression, to account for the direct effect that it might
have on corporate investment. Finally, we control for business cycle effects.13
4.2. Are under- or over-investment-free cash ﬂow sensitivities due to ﬁnancial constraints or agency costs?
To further test for the ﬁnancial constraints (FC) hypothesis of under-investment and the agency costs (AC) hypothesis of
over-investment, we next estimate the following regression:Iu newi;t ¼ a0 þ a1Dumþ a2 FCFi;t  Dumþ a3 FC Fi;t  1−Dumð Þ þ vi þ vt þ εi;t ð3Þwhere Dum represents a dummy proxying for the degree of ﬁnancial constraints or agency costs faced by ﬁrms. Speciﬁcally,
we separate ﬁrms into different groups on the basis of their a priori likelihood of facing ﬁnancial constraints or agency problems
measured using different criteria, with the aim of investigating the extent to which different groups of ﬁrms have different
sensitivities of under- and over-investment to free cash ﬂow. These further tests should enable us to shed more light on whether
the ﬁnancing constraints and agency costs hypotheses can explain investment inefﬁciency in the Chinese context. We estimate
Eqs. (2) and (3) using the ﬁxed effects (Fe) estimator to control for time-invariant ﬁrm-speciﬁc heterogeneity.14
5. Main features of the data and descriptive statistics
5.1. The dataset
The data used in this paper are drawn from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) Database and China
Center for Economics Research (CCER) Database. They cover Chinese companies that issue A-share stocks on either the Shanghai
Stock Exchange (SHSE) or the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE), during the period 1998–2014. We exclude ﬁnancial institutions
since the operating, investing and ﬁnancing activities of these ﬁrms are distinct from others. We further winsorize observations in
the one percent tails for the main regression variables to minimize the potential inﬂuence of outliers. Finally, we drop all ﬁrms
with less than three years of consecutive observations. All variables are deﬂated using the gross domestic product (GDP) deﬂator
(National Bureau of Statistics of China).
Our ﬁnal panel consists of 2113 listed ﬁrms, which corresponds to 22,373 ﬁrm–year observations. The number of ﬁrm–year
observations of each ﬁrm varies from three to seventeen, with number of observations varying from a minimum of 576 in
1998 to a maximum of 2026 in 2012.15ause free cash ﬂow is deﬁned as operating cash ﬂow net of depreciation and amortization and net of Ie_newi,t, positive sensitivities of abnormal investment to
h ﬂow are unlikely to be caused by free cash ﬂow picking up investment opportunities. Our results were generally robust to estimating a dynamic version of
and (3).
important to note that the same ﬁrmmay face both ﬁnancial constraints and agency costs at the same time. However, we believe that ﬁnancing constraints are
onounced for under-investing ﬁrms with negative free cash ﬂow, and that agency costs are more pronounced for over-investing ﬁrms with positive free cash
e footnotes 21 and 27 for a further discussion of this point.
do not include industry- and province-speciﬁc effects in Eqs. (2) and (3) because we estimate these equations using a ﬁxed-effects estimator and these effects
e canceled out through the differencing process. Furthermore, industry-speciﬁc business cycle effects do not appear in Eqs. (2) and (3) because some of the
s take on the value 1 for all observations in a cluster, and 0 otherwise (a singleton indicator). This causes singular outer-product-of-gradients (OPG) variance
s in computing the robust standard errors, which therefore makes it impossible to compute an F-statistic for the overall ﬁt of the model.
key variables in Eqs. (2) and (3) (unexpected investment and free cash ﬂow) are constructed using the residuals from the estimation of Eq. (1). For this reason,
be considered as exogenous, which justiﬁes the use of a ﬁxed effects estimator.
Tables A1 and A2 in Appendix A for details on the structure of our sample. Around 18% of ﬁrms have the full 17-year observations. Our panel is unbalanced,
g for both entry and exit. This can be seen as evidence of dynamism and may reduce potential selection and survivor bias.
•Under-
investment
•Over-
investment
•Over-
investment
G4
FCF (-)
G3
FCF (+)
FCF (+)
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G1Financial 
Constraints
Agency 
costs
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Fig. 2. Four groups of ﬁrms based on their abnormal investment and free cash ﬂow (FCF).
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In order to study the relationship between abnormal (under- or over-) investment and free cash ﬂow, we partition ﬁrm–years
into 4 sub-groups: Group 1 (under-investing ﬁrms with negative FCF), Group 2 (under-investing ﬁrms with positive FCF), Group 3
(over-investing ﬁrms with positive FCF), and Group 4 (over-investing ﬁrms with negative FCF). These groups are illustrated in
Fig. 2. Means and medians for the entire sample and four sub-samples based on their abnormal investment and free cash ﬂow
are presented in Table 1.
It can be seen that relative to total assets, the average total investment and new investment expenditure in our sample are
respectively 5.8% and 2.8%. This suggests that new investment represents a large portion of total investment (around 50%). More-
over, the average free cash ﬂow for all ﬁrm–years observations is −0.01. This small value might suggest that listed ﬁrms in China
are short of free cash ﬂow, which could be due to ﬁnancial constraints.
Interestingly, the total new investment for Group 2 (under-investing ﬁrms with positive FCF) is negative. This happens because
the depreciation plus amortization of ﬁrms in this group exceeds their total investment. Depreciation and amortization can beTable 1
Sample means and medians (in parentheses).
G1 G2 G3 G4 Total Diff (G1 vs. G3)
I_total 0.0353 0.0304 0.0826 0.1034 0.0584 0.00***
(0.0277) (0.0248) (0.0714) (0.0918) (0.041) 0.00***
I_new 0.0053 −0.0034 0.0522 0.0769 0.0282 0.00***
(0.0025) (−0.0025) (0.0401) (0.0659) (0.0135) 0.00***
Ie_new 0.034 0.0213 0.0154 0.0387 0.0282 0.00***
(0.0298) (0.0182) (0.0139) (0.0357) (0.0242) 0.00***
Iu_new −0.0287 −0.0246 0.0368 0.0383 0 0.00***
(−0.0233) (−0.0201) (0.0224) (0.0239) (−0.0061) 0.00***
FCF −0.0622 0.0552 0.0569 −0.0562 −0.0079 0.00***
(−0.0462) (0.0408) (0.0425) (−0.0439) (−0.0077) 0.00***
Cash 0.168 0.194 0.142 0.139 0.163 0.00***
(0.136) (0.16) (0.118) (0.12) (0.133) 0.00***
Q 1.885 2.049 2.016 1.818 1.937 0.00***
(1.498) (1.583) (1.579) (1.486) (1.527) 0.00***
Size 20.62 20.73 20.79 20.84 20.73 0.00***
(20.49) (20.59) (20.68) (20.71) (20.6) 0.00***
Age 9.1 10.3 10.6 9.3 9.8 0.00***
(8) (10) (10) (9) (9) 0.00***
ROA 0.014 0.045 0.039 0.025 0.029 0.00***
(0.025) (0.041) (0.039) (0.028) (0.032) 0.00***
Leverage 0.215 0.171 0.201 0.239 0.207 0.00***
(0.205) (0.147) (0.182) (0.231) (0.192) 0.00***
Observations 6355 4820 3785 4230 19,190
Notes: Firms are classiﬁed into four groups according their level of abnormal investment and FCF (free cash ﬂow): G1 (under-investing ﬁrms with negative FCF);
G2 (under-investing ﬁrms with positive FCF); G3 (over-investing ﬁrms with positive FCF); G4 (over-investing ﬁrms with negative FCF). Total investment (I_totali,t)
is deﬁned as capital expenditure less receipts from the sale of property, plant and equipment. I_new is total investment less investment to maintain existing assets
in place. Ie_new represents the expected investment expenditure in newpositiveNPVprojects. Iu_new represents the abnormal investment (under- or over-investment). FCF
is free cash ﬂowwhich is computed by subtracting the optimal level of cash ﬂow from cash ﬂow fromoperating activities (CFO). Cash is the ratio of the sum of cash and cash
equivalents to total assets.Q is themarket-to-book ratio. Size is the natural logarithmof total assets. Age is the number of years elapsed since the ﬁrm listed. ROA is the return
on assets. Leverage is the ratio of the sum of short- and long-term debt to total assets. All investment expenditure variables are scaled by total assets. All variables except Age
are deﬂated using the GDP deﬂator. See Appendix A for complete deﬁnitions of all variables. Diff is the p-value associatedwith the t-test and theWilcoxon rank-sum test for
differences in means and equality of medians of corresponding variables between ﬁrms in G1 and those in G3. *** indicates signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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reported proﬁts.
Coming to unexpected investment and free cash ﬂow, we observe that ﬁrms in Group 1 (under-investing ﬁrms with negative
FCF) have the highest negative unexpected investment and negative free cash ﬂow, which is in line with the hypothesis according
to which, due to ﬁnancial constraints, ﬁrms with negative FCF tend to under-invest. As for ﬁrms in Group 3 (over-investing ﬁrms
with positive FCF), they have the second highest positive unexpected investment and the highest free cash ﬂow, which is in line
with the hypothesis according to which ﬁrms with positive FCF tend to over-invest due to agency costs.
As for other ﬁnancial and operating variables, the statistics show that compared to ﬁrms in other groups, ﬁrms in Group 1
(under-investing ﬁrms with negative FCF) are relatively younger, smaller, and have lower ROA and high cash reserves. This
could suggest the presence of ﬁnancial constraints. On the other hand, ﬁrms in Group 3 (over-investing ﬁrms with positive
FCF) are relatively mature, large, and have high Tobin's Q, which might suggest higher agency problems.16
Finally, it is interesting to note that the number of ﬁrm–years in Group 1 (6355 observations) is larger than that in Group 3
(3785 observations), suggesting that there are more ﬁrms facing ﬁnancial constraints than ﬁrms susceptible to agency problems.
6. Main empirical results
6.1. Baseline results
Table 2 presents the key results from the estimation of the relationship between under- and over-investment and negative/
positive free cash ﬂow obtained using the ﬁxed effects estimator (Eq. (2)). Columns 1 and 2 are based on estimates of Iu_newi,t
obtained by estimating Eq. (1) with system GMM. We observe that the free cash ﬂow coefﬁcients are only signiﬁcantly positive
(at the 1% level) for the under-investing ﬁrms with negative free cash ﬂow, which are more likely to suffer from ﬁnancing con-
straints (Group 1, column 1); and the over-investing ﬁrms with positive free cash ﬂow, which are more likely to suffer from agen-
cy problems (Group 3, column 2). These ﬁndings support our hypotheses H1 and H2. Similar results are found in columns 3 and 4,
which are based on estimates of Iu_newi,t obtained from ﬁxed effects estimates of Eq. (1) .17
6.2. Robustness tests
6.2.1. Using a quantile estimator
To test the robustness of our results, we estimate Eq. (2) using a quantile estimator with ﬁxed effects. Speciﬁcally, we run sep-
arate regressions for the 20th, 50th and 80th quantiles of the distribution of Iu_newi,t, and differentiate the FCF coefﬁcients across
ﬁrms with negative and positive FCF. The advantage of using this estimator is that it enables us to examine how free cash ﬂow
inﬂuences ﬁrms' abnormal investment for ﬁrms with different levels of abnormal investment. The results, which are reported
in columns 1 to 6 of Table 3, are in line with our prior ﬁndings: we observe a positive and signiﬁcant relationship between
free cash ﬂow and abnormal investment, stronger for the under-investing ﬁrms with negative FCF and the over-investing ﬁrms
with positive FCF.
More speciﬁcally, for under-investing ﬁrms, we observe a decreasing trend of the coefﬁcients associated with FCF ∗ DumFCF b 0
when we move from the smallest quantile of abnormal investment (0.090) to the largest (0.033). This suggests that for ﬁrms with
free cash ﬂow below their optimal level, more under-investment goes hand in hand with higher FCF sensitivities.
For over-investing ﬁrms, we ﬁnd evidence of an increasing trend for the coefﬁcients associated with FCF ∗ DumFCF N 0 moving
from the smallest quantile of abnormal investment (0.020) to the largest (0.061). This indicates that for ﬁrms with free cash ﬂow
above their optimal level, more over-investment is accompanied by higher FCF sensitivities. The p-values associated with the test
for the equality of the free cash ﬂow coefﬁcients between ﬁrms with positive and negative FCF show that these differences are
generally signiﬁcant. This conﬁrms the robustness of our previous results.
6.2.2. Alternative ways of identifying under-/over-investing ﬁrms
Bergstresser (2006) notes that the distinction between under-investment and over-investment based on Richardson's (2006)
approach might have some ﬂaws as, in a dynamic setting, ex-post abnormal investment may follow ex-ante abnormal investment,
causing mean reversion. To take this problem into account, as a further robustness test, predicted abnormal investment is obtain-
ed using the ﬁtted values from the model in Eq. (1) estimated in each year using OLS. The results, reported in columns 7 and 8 of
Table 3, are consistent with our prior ﬁndings: positive and signiﬁcant coefﬁcients on free cash ﬂow are observed only for under-
investing ﬁrms with negative FCF and over-investing ﬁrms with positive FCF.
Alternatively, we rank the values of ﬁrms' abnormal investment (Iu_newi,t) by magnitude within each industry and year, and
classify a ﬁrm as under-investing (over-investing) when its abnormal investment lies below (above) the median of the distribu-
tion. The results, reported in columns 9 and 10 of Table 3, conﬁrm once again our hypotheses.16 The p-values associatedwith the t-test and theWilcoxon rank-sum test show signiﬁcant differences in these variables between ﬁrms in Group 1 and those in Group 3.
17 With the exception of columns 2 and 4, the p-values associated with the Wald tests show signiﬁcant differences in the free cash ﬂow coefﬁcients between ﬁrms
facing negative and positive FCF. Yet, in columns 2 and 4, only the coefﬁcient associated with FCF interacted with the dummy for FCF N 0 is statistically signiﬁcant.
Table 2
(Under- or over-) investment-free cash ﬂow sensitivities.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: Iu_newi,t Under_gmm Over_gmm Under_fe Over_fe
Dum_FCFN0 0.001** −0.001 0.001 −0.002*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
FCF ∗ Dum_FCFb0 0.060*** 0.014 0.044*** 0.008
(0.005) (0.015) (0.005) (0.012)
FCF ∗ Dum_FCFN0 0.015** 0.028** 0.013* 0.027**
(0.007) (0.014) (0.007) (0.011)
Firm-ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.35 0.37 0.39 0.40
Adjusted R2 0.21 0.17 0.24 0.20
ρ 0.36 0.37 0.39 0.39
Prob N F(overall ﬁt) 34.27 8.23 18.84 6.84
Diff 0.00*** 0.49 0.00*** 0.27
Observations 11,175 8015 10,541 8649
Notes: All speciﬁcationswere estimated using the ﬁxed effects estimator. Test statistics and standard errors (in parentheses) of all variables in the regressions are asymptot-
ically robust to heteroscedasticity. ρ represents the proportion of the total error variance accounted for by unobserved heterogeneity. The dependent variable is unexpected
investment (Iu_newi,t) calculated adopting Richardson's (2006)method, where over-investing (under-investing) ﬁrms are characterized by positive (negative) abnormal in-
vestment (Iu_newi,t). FCF is free cash ﬂow which is computed by subtracting the optimal level of cash ﬂow from cash ﬂow from operating activities (CFO). Dum_FCFb0 is a
dummy variable, which is equal to 1 in year t if a ﬁrm's free cash ﬂow in that year is negative (FCF b 0), and 0 otherwise. Dum_FCFN0 is a dummy variable, which is equal
to 1 in year t if a ﬁrm's free cash ﬂow in that year is positive (FCF N 0), and 0 otherwise. Under_gmm (Over_gmm) and Under_fe (Over_fe) refer to abnormal investment ob-
tained by estimating Eq. (1) using the systemGMMand the ﬁxed effects estimator, respectively (see Table A3 in Appendix A).Diff is the p-value of theWald statistic for the
equality of the free cash ﬂow coefﬁcients for ﬁrms facing positive and negative FCF. *, **, and *** indicate signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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approach, we compute the abnormal investment for a given ﬁrm in a given year (Iu’_newi,t) as the difference between the ﬁrm's new in-
vestment expenditure (I_newi,t) and the industrymedian level of new investment (I_newj,t) in that year. This difference (Iu′_newi,t) can beTable 3
(Under- or over-) investment-free cash ﬂow sensitivities: further tests.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Dependent variable: Under_gmm Over_gmm Under_gmm Over_gmm Under_gmm Over_gmm Under_gmm Over_gmm Under_gmm Over_gmm
Iu_newi,t 20th Quant 20th Quant 50th Quant 50th Quant 80th Quant 80th Quant b50th N50th
Most under-investment —› Most over-investment
Dum_FCFN0 0.001 −0.001 0.001 −0.001 0.001* −0.004 0.001 −0.002 0.002** −0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
FCF ∗ Dum_FCFb0 0.090*** 0.015* 0.054*** 0.006 0.033*** 0.004 0.043*** 0.007 0.057*** 0.012
(0.016) (0.008) (0.007) (0.013) (0.005) (0.022) (0.005) (0.017) (0.005) (0.013)
FCF ∗ Dum_FCFN0 0.020 0.020*** 0.013** 0.043*** 0.009 0.061** 0.004 0.028* 0.015** 0.036***
(0.015) (0.007) (0.006) (0.012) (0.007) (0.027) (0.006) (0.017) (0.007) (0.012)
Firm-ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-ﬁxed effects No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
(Pseudo) R2 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.42 0.41 0.38 0.34
Adjusted R2 0.31 0.24 0.22 0.16
ρ 0.37 0.40 0.36 0.35
Prob N F(overall ﬁt) 19.77 11.95 35.77 5.72
Diff 0.00*** 0.66 0.00*** 0.04** 0.00*** 0.10* 0.00*** 0.40 0.00*** 0.19
Observations 11,175 8015 11,175 8015 11,175 8015 13,119 8678 9599 9591
Notes: The speciﬁcations in columns 1 to 6 were estimated using the quantile estimator with ﬁxed effects, and those in columns 7 to 10, using the ﬁxed effects
estimator. For the quantile regression, we run separate regressions for the 20th, 50th, 80th quantiles of abnormal investment with bootstrapped standard errors
(1000 repetitions). Test statistics and standard errors (in parentheses) of all variables in the regressions are asymptotically robust to heteroscedasticity. The depen-
dent variable is unexpected investment (Iu_newi,t) calculated using Richardson's (2006) method, where in columns 1 to 6, under-investing (over-investing) ﬁrms
are characterized by negative (positive) abnormal investment (Iu_newi,t). In columns 7 and 8, under-/over-investment are obtained from the estimation of Eq (1)
separately in each year using OLS. In columns 9 and 10, we deﬁne under-investment (over-investment) when in a given year, ﬁrm i's abnormal investment is
below (above) the median value of the distribution of the abnormal investment of all ﬁrms belonging to the same industry as ﬁrm i in that year. FCF is computed
by subtracting the optimal level of cash ﬂow from cash ﬂow from operating activities (CFO). Dum_FCFb0 is a dummy variable, which is equal to 1 in year t if a
ﬁrm's free cash ﬂow in that year is negative (FCF b 0), and 0 otherwise. Dum_FCFN0 is a dummy variable, which is equal to 1 in year t if a ﬁrm's free cash ﬂow
in that year is positive (FCF N 0), and 0 otherwise. For the ﬁxed effects regression in columns 7 to 10, ρ represents the proportion of the total error variance
accounted for by unobserved heterogeneity. Diff is the p-value of the Wald statistic for the equality of the free cash ﬂow coefﬁcients for ﬁrms facing positive
and negative FCF. *, **, and *** indicate signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Table 4
(Under- or over-) investment-free cash ﬂow sensitivities: using Bates' (2005) deﬁnitions of abnormal investment
and free cash ﬂow.
Dependent variable:
Iu′_newi,t
(1) (2)
Under_ gmm Over_ gmm
Iu′_newi,t − 1 0.267*** −0.001
(0.020) (0.027)
Dum_FCF’N0 −0.002 −0.002
(0.003) (0.004)
FCF’ ∗ Dum_FCF’b0 0.091*** 0.002
(0.033) (0.061)
FCF’ ∗ Dum_FCF’N0 0.001 0.142***
(0.037) (0.052)
Cashi,t − 1 0.154*** 0.182***
(0.012) (0.019)
Qi,t − 1 −0.002* −0.004**
(0.001) (0.002)
Sizei,t − 1 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.002)
Agei,t 0.001*** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
ROAi,t − 1 0.106*** 0.204***
(0.017) (0.055)
Leveragei,t − 1 0.012 0.048**
(0.008) (0.019)
Year-ﬁxed effects yes yes
Industry-ﬁxed effects yes yes
Province-ﬁxed effects yes yes
Prob N F(overall ﬁt) 21.31 8.21
Hansen J test (p-value) 0.00*** 0.00***
m2 test (p-value) 0.01** 0.12
Diff 0.09* 0.09*
Observations 9789 9401
Notes: All speciﬁcations were estimated using the system GMM estimator. Test statistics and standard errors
(in parentheses) of all variables in the regressions are asymptotically robust to heteroscedasticity. Adopting
Bates' (2005) method, the dependent variable is Iu′_newi,t, the difference between a ﬁrm's new investment ex-
penditure (I_new i,t) in a given year and that of the median ﬁrm in the industry in which the ﬁrm operates
(I_newj,t) in that year. Under-investing (over-investing) ﬁrms are characterized by negative (positive) abnor-
mal investment (Iu′_newi,t ). FCF′i,t is calculated as the difference between the ﬁrm's cash ﬂow generated
from assets in place in a given year (CFAIP,i,t) and that of the median ﬁrm in the industry in which the ﬁrm
operates in that year (CFAIP,j,t.). Dum_FCF’b0 is a dummy variable, which is equal to 1 in a given year if a ﬁrm's
CFAIP,i,t is below its optimal level (proxied by the ﬁrm's industry's median CFAIP,j,t), and 0 otherwise. Dum_FCF’N0
is a dummy variable, which is equal to 1 in a given year if a ﬁrm's CFAIP,i,t exceeds its optimal level (i.e. the
median of the ﬁrm's industry's CFAIP,j,t.), and 0 otherwise. All variables except Qi,t − 1, Sizei,t − 1 and Agei,t are
scaled by total assets. We treat Iu′_new, FCF′, Cash, Q, Size, ROA, and Leveragei,t as potentially endogenous vari-
ables. Levels of these variables lagged twice or more are used as instruments in the ﬁrst-differenced equations
and ﬁrst-differences of these same variables lagged once, as additional instruments in the level equations. m2
is a test for second-order serial correlation of the residuals in the differenced equations, asymptotically distrib-
uted as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. The Hansen J test of over-identifying restrictions is dis-
tributed as Chi-square under the null of instrument validity. Diff is the p-value of the Wald statistic for the
equality of the free cash ﬂow coefﬁcients for ﬁrms facing positive and negative FCF′. *, **, and *** indicate sig-
niﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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pute it as the difference between cash ﬂow generated from assets in place (CFAIP,i,t) for a given ﬁrm in a given year and the industry me-
dian level of cash ﬂow generated from assets in place in that year (CFAIP,j,t).19 Accordingly, FCF′ can be either positive or negative.
To examine the relationship between these alternative measures of (under- or over-) investment and free cash ﬂow, we esti-
mate the following dynamic variant of Eq. (1), where DumFCF’ N 0 (DumFCF’ b 0) is a dummy equal to 1 if the ﬁrm has a positive
(negative) FCF’i,t, and 0 otherwise:18 As t
expecte
can con
19 CFAIu
0
newi;t ¼ a0 þ a1Iu
0
newi;t−1 þ a2DumFC F 0 N0 þ a3 FCF 0i;t  DumFC F 0b0
þ a4 FCF 0i;t  DumFC F 0 N0 þ a5Cashi;t−1 þ a6Qi;t−1 þ a7Sizei;t−1 þ a8Agei;t
þ a9ROAi;t−1 þ a10Leveragei;t−1 þ vi þ vt þ vj þ vp þ εi;t
ð4Þhe expected investment estimate based on Bates' method (2005) is an out-of-sample estimate in a group of peer companies, this can tackle the concern that the
d investment based on Richardson's (2006) method might be endogenous. If measuring abnormal investment using both methods delivers similar results, we
clude that our main results based on Richardson's (2006) model are not driven by endogeneity.
IP,i,t is calculated as (CFOi,t − I_main.i,t).
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the regressors, as well as for ﬁrm-speciﬁc and time-invariant heterogeneity. The results are reported in Table 4. In line with our
previous ﬁndings, they show that the impact of free cash ﬂow on under-investment is only signiﬁcantly positive for the ﬁrms with
negative FCF′i,t (column 1), while the impact of fee cash ﬂow on over-investment is only signiﬁcant for ﬁrms with positive FCF′i,t
(column 2).
In summary, we have constructed measures of under- and over-investment and free cash ﬂow, and generally found a positive
and signiﬁcant relationship between investment and free cash ﬂow only for Group 1 ﬁrms (under-investing ﬁrms with negative
FCF) and Group 3 ﬁrms (over-investing ﬁrms with positive FCF). We interpreted these ﬁndings as evidence in favor of the ﬁnanc-
ing constraints (FC) and agency costs (AC) hypotheses, respectively. We next dig deeper into these interpretations by analyzing
these sensitivities for ﬁrms facing higher/lower degrees of ﬁnancing constraints and agency costs, measured using a variety of dif-
ferent criteria.
7. To what extent does heterogeneity in the degree of ﬁnancing constraints and agency costs faced by ﬁrms affect the sensitivities
of under- and over-investment to free cash ﬂow?
7.1. The ﬁnancing constraints (FC) hypothesis of under-investment
7.1.1. Measuring ﬁnancing constraints using the Kaplan and Zingales (KZ) index and the Whited and Wu (WW) index
We now provide further tests of the ﬁnancing constraints hypothesis of under-investment. To this end, we restrict our sample
to under-investing observations, and use two indexes to measure ﬁrm-speciﬁc levels of the constraints: the Kaplan and Zingales
(KZ) index (Lamont et al., 2001) and the Whited and Wu (WW) index (Whited and Wu, 2006).
Focusing on the former, we note that Kaplan and Zingales (1997) classify their sample of USﬁrms intoﬁve groups on the basis of their
degree ofﬁnancial constraints based on qualitative information contained in theﬁrms' annual reports, aswell as quantitative information
regarding management's statements on liquidity. Motivated by Kaplan and Zingales (1997), Lamont et al. (2001) perform an ordered
Logit estimation of the categories of constraints on the following ﬁve ﬁnancial ratios, using the original KZ sample: cash ﬂow (CFt, net
income + depreciation), dividends (DIVt), cash and cash equivalents (Casht) all deﬂated by beginning of year capital (Kt − 1); Tobin's
Q (Qt, market value of equity + market value of net debt)/(total assets − net intangible assets)); and debt (Debtt, the sum of the
short-term and long-term debt) to total capital (TKt, sum of debt and equity). We use the estimated coefﬁcients that they obtain to con-
struct the Kaplan and Zingales (KZ) index of ﬁnancial constraints in the following way:Table 5
Summa
Under
Under
Diff (G
(M
Over_
Over_
Diff (G
(M
Total
Notes: K
index (W
ﬁrms w
percent
median
Group 4KZ ¼−1:002  CFt=Kt−1 þ 0:283  Qt þ 3:139  Debtt=TKt
−39:368  DIVt=Kt−1ð Þ−1:315  Casht=Kt−1 ð5ÞA ﬁrm with a higher value of the KZ index can be intended to be more ﬁnancially constrained.
We also use an alternative index of constraints (the WW index), constructed by Whited and Wu (2006). This index is a linear
function of the following six observable ﬁrm characteristics: cash ﬂow [CFt/BAt − 1, (net income + depreciation)/beginning-of-
year book assets]; a dividend indicator (DIVPOSt, indicating positive dividends); long-term debt (TLTDt/CAt − 1, long-term debtry statistics of ﬁnancial constrains (KZ andWW indexes) for under- and over-investing ﬁrms.
FC index Mean St. Dev. P25 P50 P75 N obs
G1 KZ −5.131 15.115 −4.672 −0.804 0.866 6351
_ FCFb0 WW −0.941 0.073 −0.986 −0.942 −0.890 6347
G2 KZ −5.639 14.554 −5.529 −1.370 0.604 4819
_ FCFN0 WW −0.951 0.073 −0.997 −0.953 −0.900 4818
1 vs. G2) KZ 0.04** Diff (G1 vs. G2) 0.00***
ean) WW 0.00*** (Median) 0.00***
G3 KZ −3.973 12.692 −3.860 −0.815 0.770 3782
FCFN0 WW −0.955 0.080 −1.004 −0.957 −0.900 3779
G4 KZ −3.716 11.725 −3.678 −0.846 0.712 4230
FCFb0 WW −0.955 0.071 −1.000 −0.956 −0.909 4227
3 vs. G4) KZ 0.17 Diff (G3 vs. G4) 0.83
ean) WW 0.74 (Median) 0.53
KZ −4.719 13.838 −4.425 −0.945 0.752 19,182
WW −0.949 0.074 −0.995 −0.951 −0.899 19,171
Z and WW represent ﬁrm-speciﬁc levels of ﬁnancial constraints: the Kaplan and Zingales (KZ) index (Lamont et al., 2001) and the Whited and Wu (WW)
hited and Wu, 2006). Firms are classiﬁed into the following four groups: Group 1 (under-investing ﬁrms with negative FCF); Group 2 (under-investing
ith positive FCF); Group 3 (over-investing ﬁrms with positive FCF); Group 4 (over-investing ﬁrms with negative FCF). P25 (50/75) is the 25th (50th/75th)
ile of the respective distribution. Diff is the p-value associated with the t-test and the Wilcoxon rank-sum test for differences in means and equality of
s of the KZ (WW) indexes between groups of under-investing ﬁrms (Group 1 and Group 2) or between groups of over-investing ﬁrms (Group 3 and
). ** and *** indicate signiﬁcance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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industry sales growth (ISGt). We compute the WW index as follows, using the estimated coefﬁcients from Whited and Wu's
(2006) speciﬁcation:Table 6
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the freeWW ¼−0:091  CFt=BAt−1−0:062  DIVPOSt þ 0:021  TLTDt=CAt−1
−0:044  LNTAt−0:035  SGt þ 0:102  ISGt ð6ÞOnce again, a higher value of the WW index is representative of a higher level of ﬁnancial constraints.
Table 5 presents summary statistics of the twoﬁrm-speciﬁc indexes of ﬁnancing constraints across the four groups of ﬁrms based on
their abnormal investment and free cashﬂow.We conduct statistical tests for equality of both samplemeans (t-test) and samplemedians
(Wilcoxon rank-sum test) across groups of ﬁrms.
According to the ﬁnancial constraints (FC) hypothesis, ﬁrms are more likely to under-invest if they face a higher degree of
ﬁnancing constraints. To test this hypothesis, we compare the two indexes across under-investing ﬁrms in Group 1 and Group
2. We ﬁnd that, regardless of whether we use the mean or the median, the level of ﬁnancial constraints (measured using both
the KZ and WW indexes) for Group 1 (under-investing ﬁrms with negative FCF) is larger than that for Group 2 (under-investing
ﬁrms with positive FCF). As can be seen from the p-values of both tests, the differences in the means and the medians of the in-
dicators between the two groups are generally signiﬁcant at the 5% level. This suggests that differences in the ﬁnancial constraints
faced by ﬁrms are a key factor in distinguishing between the ﬁrms in Group 1 and Group 2. Thus, as discussed in the former sec-
tion, ﬁnancial constraints may contribute to the higher responsiveness of under-investment to free cash ﬂow for the ﬁrms in
Group 1.
In order to investigate the extent to which the degree of ﬁnancial constraints faced by ﬁrms affects the sensitivity of under-
investment to free cash ﬂow, Table 6 presents ﬁxed effects estimates of Eq. (3), which tests the effects of free cash ﬂow on
under-investment for ﬁrms characterized by different degrees of ﬁnancial constraints, calculated using the KZ index (columns 1
and 2) and the WW index (columns 3 and 4). In columns 1 and 3, following Almeida et al. (2004), we classify ﬁrms as facing
relatively low (Low_FC = 1), medium (Medium_FC = 1), and high (High_FC = 1) ﬁnancial constraints in a given year if their
KZ or WW index in that year fall respectively in the bottom three, the middle four, and the top three deciles of the distributionnvestment-free cash ﬂow sensitivities: accounting for ﬁnancial constraints using the KZ andWW indexes.
ndent variable: Iu_newi,t (1) (2) (3) (4)
KZ_under KZ_under WW_under WW_under
m_FC(30–70) 0.001 −0.002***
(0.001) (0.001)
FC(N70) 0.003*** −0.002**
(0.001) (0.001)
∗ Low_FC(b30) 0.036*** 0.036***
(0.005) (0.005)
∗ Medium_FC(30–70) 0.050*** 0.043***
(0.004) (0.004)
∗ High_FC(N70) 0.054*** 0.057***
(0.005) (0.005)
FC(b50) 0.002*** −0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
∗ Low_FC(b50) 0.040*** 0.039***
(0.004) (0.004)
∗ High_FC(N50) 0.054*** 0.053***
(0.004) (0.004)
ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35
ted R2 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21
0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36
N F(overall ﬁt) 30.30 33.51 30.55 33.07
0.01** 0.01** 0.00*** 0.00***
vations 11,170 11,170 11,165 11,165
ll speciﬁcations were estimated using the ﬁxed effects estimator. Test statistics and standard errors (in parentheses) of all variables in the regressions are
otically robust to heteroscedasticity. ρ represents the proportion of the total error variance accounted for by unobserved heterogeneity. The dependent var-
unexpected investment (Iu_newi,t) calculated adopting Richardson's (2006) method, where under-investing ﬁrms are characterized by negative abnormal
ent (Iu_newi,t). FCFi,t is computed by subtracting the optimal level of cash ﬂow from cash ﬂow from operating activities (CFO). High_FC, Medium_FC and
are dummy variables, equal to 1 in a given year if a ﬁrm faces high, medium, or low ﬁnancial constraints, and 0 otherwise. Speciﬁcally, in columns 1
e consider a ﬁrm to be ﬁnancially constrained (unconstrained) in a given year if its KZ or WW index lies in the top (bottom) three deciles of the distri-
f the corresponding variables for all ﬁrms belonging to the same industry in that year. The remaining ﬁrm–years will be the ones who face a medium level
cial constraints. In columns 2 and 4, a ﬁrm is considered to be ﬁnancially constrained in a given year if its KZ or WW index exceeds the median value of the
alculated in the industry the ﬁrm belongs to in that year, and ﬁnancially unconstrained otherwise. Diff is the p-value of the Wald statistic for the equality of
cash ﬂow coefﬁcients across ﬁrms characterized by high and low ﬁnancing constraints. ** and *** indicate signiﬁcance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
122 A. Guariglia, J. Yang / Journal of Corporate Finance 36 (2016) 111–130of the indexes of all ﬁrms operating in the same industry they belong to.20 In this way, we allow ﬁrms in our sample to transit
between categories each year. In columns 2 and 4, we use a 50% threshold.
Columns 1 and 3 reveal that for under-investing ﬁrms, the higher the KZ index or the WW index, the larger the sensitivities of
under-investment to free cash ﬂow. This suggests that sensitivities of abnormal investment to free cash ﬂow tend to increase
monotonically with the degree of external ﬁnancial constraints faced by ﬁrms. Similar results are found in columns 2 and 4
when we use a 50% threshold. The p-values of the Wald tests reported at the foot of the Table reject the equality of the coefﬁ-
cients of free cash ﬂow between more and less ﬁnancially constrained groups. This supports our hypothesis H1: for under-
investing ﬁrms, the sensitivities of investment to free cash ﬂow increase with the ﬁrm's degree of ﬁnancial constraints.21
7.1.2. Further tests: measuring ﬁnancing constraints using size and age
Next, we use different variables based on the a priori likelihood that a ﬁrm faces ﬁnancial constraints to test our Hypothesis 1.
If our hypothesis holds, we should expect a stronger relationship between under-investment and free cash ﬂow for ﬁrms which
are a priori more likely to face ﬁnancial constraints. Speciﬁcally, we focus on ﬁrms' size (total real assets) and age, which have
been commonly used in the literature to partition ﬁrms into a priori more and less likely to face ﬁnancing constraints. Small
and young ﬁrms might not have a sufﬁciently long track record, leading to increased asymmetric information. In addition,
small and young ﬁrms are typically characterized by high idiosyncratic risk and high bankruptcy costs, which might exclude
them from credit markets, or make their access to external ﬁnance more costly (Beck et al., 2005; Clementi and Hopenhayn,
2006; Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994; Guariglia, 2008).
The results are reported in Table 7. In columns 1 and 3, we deﬁne a ﬁrm as facing a high level of ﬁnancing constraints
(High_FC = 1) in a given year if its size (column 1) and age (column 3) fall in the bottom three deciles of the distribution of
the assets/age of all ﬁrms operating in the same industry as that ﬁrm in that year. Similarly, we deﬁne as ﬁrm-years facing a me-
dium level of ﬁnancing constraints (Medium_FC = 1) those observations falling in the middle four deciles of the distribution, and
as ﬁrm-years facing a low level of ﬁnancing constraints (Low_FC = 1), those observations falling in the top three deciles of the
distribution. In columns 2 and 4, we only consider two categories of ﬁrm–years: those facing high and low ﬁnancing constraints,
split at the median of real assets (column 2) and age (column 4).
The results in column 1 show a clear increasing trend for the coefﬁcients of free cash ﬂow, moving from large, to medium-
sized, to small ﬁrms. The Wald test reported at the foot of the table shows that the differences in the FCF coefﬁcients between
large and small ﬁrm–years are signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Hence, using ﬁrm size as a proxy for ﬁnancing constraints also supports
our Hypothesis 1. Similar results are obtained when ﬁrms are split in two size categories (column 2), and when age is used as a
partitioning criterion (columns 3 and 4).22
In summary, the results we obtained using conventional variables as proxies for ﬁnancial constraints, which suggests that for
under-investing ﬁrms, the sensitivities of investment to free cash ﬂow increase with the ﬁrm's degree of ﬁnancial constraints
faced by ﬁrms, are highly consistent with our previous ﬁndings and Hypothesis 1.
7.2. The agency costs (AC) hypothesis of over-investment
7.2.1. Measuring agency costs using the ratio of other receivables to total assets and the difference between the blockholder's controlling and
ownership rights
We now move on to testing the agency costs (AC) hypothesis of over-investment. To this end, we focus on over-investing ob-
servations. It has been argued that the conﬂict between controlling shareholders and minority investors (tunneling) is widespread
in emerging markets like China since most listed companies tend to have a concentrated ownership structure.23 In addition, cor-
porate governance mechanisms and the legal system in China offer few options to protect minority shareholders from controlling
shareholders (Jiang et al., 2010; Liu and Lu, 2007).
Our initial measures of agency costs emphasize therefore the conﬂict between controlling shareholders and minority investors.
Speciﬁcally, following Jiang et al. (2010), we ﬁrst use the ratio of other receivables to total assets (OREC) to measure how likely
controlling shareholders are of expropriating minority investors.24 A higher value of OREC implies a higher level of expropriation
and, hence, a higher level of agency costs. Average other receivables in our sample constitute about 4% of total assets, and the
maximum value of the ratio is around 50%, suggesting a high level of agency costs.
Next, inspired by Claessens et al. (2002), Lemmon and Lins (2003), and Jiang et al. (2010), we proxy the likelihood to tunnel
using a dummy equal to 1 if the ﬁrm exhibits a difference between its largest shareholder's (also known as blockholder) controlling right20 It is worth mentioning that we do not mean that ﬁrms ranked in the top three deciles of the distribution of the KZ andWW indexes are absolutely ﬁnancially
constrained, while ﬁrms in the bottom three deciles are absolutely ﬁnancially unconstrained. Instead,we argue that those ﬁrms in the top three deciles are likely to face
more severe ﬁnancing constraints than those in the bottom three deciles.
21 Estimating similar regressions on the sample of over-investing ﬁrms delivered similar coefﬁcients across the groups of ﬁrms characterized by different degrees of
ﬁnancing constraints. These results, which are not reported for brevity but available on request, conﬁrm that the FC hypothesis is unlikely to hold for over-investing
ﬁrms.
22 Yet, in column 3, the Wald test shows that the difference in the FCF coefﬁcients between older and younger ﬁrm–years is not statistically signiﬁcant.
23 In China, the ownership of a single dominant shareholder is typically much larger than that of the second shareholder.
24 According to Jiang et al. (2010), “during 1996–2006, tens of billions of RMBwere siphoned [through inter-corporate loans] from hundreds of Chinese listed ﬁrms by
controlling shareholders” (p.2). The authors explain that these inter-corporate loans are typically reported as “other receivables”. This variable is also used byQuian and
Yeung (2015).
Table 7
Under-investment-free cash ﬂow sensitivities: accounting for ﬁnancial constraints using size and age.
Dependent variable:
Iu_newi,t
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total assets Total assets Age Age
Low_FC(b30) 0.007*** 0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
Medium_FC(30–70) 0.004*** 0.003***
(0.001) (0.001)
FCFi,t ∗ Low_FC(b30) 0.039*** 0.040***
(0.006) (0.005)
FCFi,t ∗ Medium_FC(30–70) 0.038*** 0.046***
(0.004) (0.004)
FCFi,t ∗ High_FC(N70) 0.064*** 0.052***
(0.005) (0.006)
High_ FC(N50) 0.004*** 0.001*
(0.001) (0.001)
FCFi,t ∗ Low_ FC(b50) 0.037*** 0.042***
(0.004) (0.004)
FCFi,t ∗ High_ FC(N50) 0.055*** 0.051***
(0.004) (0.004)
Firm-ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.36 0.36 0.35 0.36
Adjusted R2 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21
ρ 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.35
Prob>F (overall ﬁt) 33.39 35.34 30.68 32.86
Diff 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.12 0.08*
Observations 11,175 11,175 11,175 11,175
Notes: All speciﬁcations were estimated using the ﬁxed effects estimator. Test statistics and standard errors (in parentheses) of all variables in the regressions are
asymptotically robust to heteroscedasticity. ρ represents the proportion of the total error variance accounted for by unobserved heterogeneity. The dependent var-
iable is unexpected investment (Iu_newi,t) calculated adopting Richardson's method (2006), where under-investing ﬁrms are characterized by negative abnormal
investment (Iu_newi,t). FCFi,t is computed by subtracting the optimal level of cash ﬂow from cash ﬂow from operating activities (CFO). Low_FC, Medium_FC, and
High_FC are dummy variables equal to 1 in a given year, respectively, if the ﬁrm is likely to face low, medium, and high ﬁnancial constraints relatively to all
ﬁrms operating in the same industry it belongs to in that year, and 0 otherwise. Speciﬁcally, in columns 1 and 3, we consider a ﬁrm facing low (high) ﬁnancial
constraints in a given year if its size (real total assets) and age respectively lie in the top (bottom) three deciles of the distribution of the corresponding variables
for all ﬁrms belonging to the same industry in that year. The remaining ﬁrm–years will be the ones who face a medium level of ﬁnancial constraints. In columns 2
and 4, we consider a ﬁrm facing low (high) ﬁnancial constraints in a given year if its size and age respectively lie in the bottom (top) half of the distribution of the
corresponding variables of all ﬁrms belonging to the same industry in that year. Diff is the p-value of the Wald statistic for the equality of the free cash ﬂow co-
efﬁcients across ﬁrms characterized by high and low ﬁnancing constraints. *, **, and *** indicate signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
123A. Guariglia, J. Yang / Journal of Corporate Finance 36 (2016) 111–130(C) and cash ﬂowownership right (O), and 0 otherwise. In the presence of a divergence between her/his controlling right and ownership
right, the blockholder may control the ﬁrm by only holding a relatively low proportion of shares. This is made possible through pyramid
structures and cross-holding among ﬁrms, which often lead to the expropriation of minority shareholders.Table 8
Summary statistics of agency costs (OREC and C/O) for under- and over-investing ﬁrms.
FC index Mean St. Dev. P25 P50 P75 N Obs
G1 OREC 0.054 0.114 0.026 0.041 0.054 6352
Under_ FCFb0 C/O 46.70% 49.90% 0 0 1 4869
G2 OREC 0.218 11.375 0.029 0.047 0.069 4819
Under_ FCFN0 C/O 48.43% 0 0 1 3669
Diff (G1 vs. G2) OREC 0.00*** Diff (G1 vs. G2) 0.00***
(Mean) C/O 0.06* (Median) 0.11
G3 OREC 0.055 0.094 0.026 0.044 0.067 4228
Over_ FCFN0 C/O 46.70% 49.90% 0 0 1 3357
G4 OREC 0.044 0.045 0.022 0.037 0.055 3783
Over_ FCFb0 C/O 45.34% 49.79% 0 0 1 2880
Diff (G3 vs. G4) OREC 0.00*** Diff (G3 vs. G4) 0.00***
(Mean) C/O 0.14 (Median) 0.28
Total OREC 0.093 5.702 0.026 0.042 0.063 19,182
C/O 46.8% 49.90% 0 0 1 14,775
Notes: OREC (other receivable scaled by total assets) and C/O (dummy equal to 1 if the ﬁrm exhibits a divergence between controlling and ownership rights, and 0
otherwise) represent ﬁrm-speciﬁc levels of agency costs. Firms are classiﬁed into the following four groups: Group 1 (under-investing ﬁrms with negative FCF);
Group 2 (under-investing ﬁrms with positive FCF); Group 3 (over-investing ﬁrms with positive FCF); Group 4 (over-investing ﬁrms with negative FCF). P25
(50/75) is the 25th (50th/75th) percentile of the distribution of the relevant variable. Diff is the p-value associated with the t-test and the Wilcoxon rank-sum
test for differences in means and equality of medians of the ﬁrm-level agency costs between groups of under-investing ﬁrms (Group 1 and Group 2) or between
groups of over-investing ﬁrms (Group 3 and Group 4). * and *** indicate signiﬁcance at the 10%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Table 9
Over-investment-free cash ﬂow sensitivities: accounting for agency costs using OREC and C/O.
Dependent variable: Iu_newi,t (1) (2) (3)
OREC OREC C/O
Medium_ AC(30–70) −0.001
(0.001)
High_ AC(N70) −0.007***
(0.002)
FCFi,t ∗ Low_ AC(b30) 0.015
(0.012)
FCFi,t ∗ Medium_ AC(30–70) 0.013
(0.011)
FCFi,t ∗ High_ AC(N70) 0.028**
(0.012)
High_AC(N50) −0.006*** 0.002
(0.001) (0.002)
FCFi,t ∗ Low_AC(b50) 0.016* 0.016
(0.010) (0.011)
FCFi,t ∗ High_ AC(N50) 0.021** 0.031***
(0.010) (0.011)
Firm-ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year-ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.38 0.38 0.42
Adjusted R2 0.18 0.18 0.18
ρ 0.37 0.37 0.40
Prob N F(overall ﬁt) 8.37 9.37 8.64
Diff 0.47 0.71 0.35
Observations 8015 8015 6237
Notes: All speciﬁcations were estimated using the ﬁxed effects estimator. Test statistics and standard errors (in parentheses) of all variables in the regressions are
asymptotically robust to heteroscedasticity. ρ represents the proportion of the total error variance accounted for by unobserved heterogeneity. The dependent
variable is unexpected investment (Iu_newi,t) calculated adopting Richardson's method (2006), where over-investing ﬁrms are characterized by positive abnormal
investment (Iu_newi,t). FCFi,t is computed by subtracting the optimal level of cash ﬂow from operating activities (CFO). High_AC, Medium_AC and Low_AC are
dummy variables, equal to 1 in a given year if a ﬁrm faces respectively high, medium, and low agency costs compared to all ﬁrms belonging to the same industry
it belongs to, and 0 otherwise. Speciﬁcally, in column 1, we deﬁne a ﬁrm as facing high (low) agency costs in a given year if its OREC lies in the top (bottom) three
deciles of the distribution of the ORECs of all ﬁrms operating in its same industry in that year. The remaining ﬁrm–years will be the ones who face a medium level
of agency costs. As for column 2, a ﬁrm is considered as facing high (low) agency costs in a given year if its OREC exceeds (is below) the median value of the
distribution of the ORECs of all ﬁrms operating in the same industry it belongs to in that year. In column 3, a ﬁrm is considered as facing high (low) agency
costs in a given year if its blockholder's controlling right exceeds (does not exceed) its cash ﬂow right in a given year. Diff is the p-value of the Wald statistic
for the equality of the free cash ﬂow coefﬁcients across ﬁrms characterized by high and low agency costs. *, **, and *** indicate signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and
1% levels, respectively.
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groups based on their abnormal investments and free cash ﬂow. As in Table 5, we conduct statistical tests for the equality of both
sample means (t-test) and sample medians (Wilcoxon rank-sum test) across groups.
Comparing Group 3 (over-investing ﬁrms with positive FCF) with Group 4 (over-investing ﬁrms with negative FCF), we
observe that the mean level of agency costs measured by both OREC and the percentage of ﬁrm–year observations exhibiting a
difference between the blockholder's controlling and ownership rights (C/O) are higher for the former group. As for the median,
it is higher for Group 3 when we focus on OREC, but equal to 0 for both groups of ﬁrms when we focus on C/O .25 These statistics
suggest that ﬁrms in Group 3 suffer from higher agency costs than those in Group 4. This is not surprising as these ﬁrms dispose
of a higher FCF, which they can use for tunneling purposes.
To explore this issue further, Table 9 presents the ﬁxed effects estimates of Eq. (3), aimed at testing the effects of changes in
free cash ﬂow on over-investment for ﬁrms characterized by different levels of agency costs measured using OREC (columns 1 and
2) and C/O (columns 3). Speciﬁcally, in column 1, we classify a ﬁrm as facing relatively low (Low_AC = 1), medium
(Medium_AC= 1), or high (High_AC = 1) agency costs in a given year if its OREC ratio in that year falls respectively in the bottom
three, the middle four, or the top three deciles of the corresponding OREC ratios of all ﬁrms operating in the same industry the
ﬁrm belongs to in that year. In column 2, we use a 50% threshold. In both cases, we observe that the sensitivity of investment
to free cash ﬂow is positive and signiﬁcant at the 5% level or higher only for ﬁrms with a high degree of agency costs.
In column 3, we deﬁne a ﬁrm as facing high (low) agency costs in a given year if it exhibits (does not exhibit) a divergence
between its blockholder's controlling ownership and cash ﬂow ownership. Only those ﬁrms characterized by a divergence exhibit25 The statistical tests indicate, however, that only the differences in the means and medians of OREC between the two groups are statistically signiﬁcant. This is not
surprising since themedian value of the dummyequal to 1 if theﬁrmexhibits a divergence between its blockholder's controlling and ownership rights, and 0 otherwise
(C/O), is equal to zero for both Group 3 and Group 4.
Table 10
Over-investment-free cash ﬂow sensitivities: accounting for agency costs using blockholder's and CEO shareholding.
Dependent variable:
Iu_newi,t
(1) (2)
Blockholder Shareholding_CEO
Insider 0.002
(0.002)
FCFi,t ∗ Outsider 0.031***
(0.010)
FCFi,t∗ Insider 0.016
(0.015)
Medium_ Share(30–70) −0.000
(0.002)
High_ Share(N70) −0.001
(0.002)
FCFi,t∗ Low_ Share(b30) 0.016
(0.012)
FCFi,t∗ Medium_ Share(30–70) 0.023**
(0.011)
FCFi,t∗ High_ Share(N70) 0.014
(0.012)
Firm-ﬁxed effects Yes Yes
Year-ﬁxed effects Yes Yes
R2 0.38 0.40
Adjusted R2 0.17 0.16
ρ 0.37 0.40
Prob>F (overall ﬁt) 7.40 7.19
Diff(Low VS Medium) 0.66
Diff (Medium VS High) 0.58
Diff (Low VS High) 0.92 0.40
Observations 8015 6146
Notes: All speciﬁcations were estimated using the ﬁxed effects estimator. Test statistics and standard errors (in parentheses)
of all variables in the regressions are asymptotically robust to heteroscedasticity. ρ represents the proportion of the total
error variance accounted for by unobserved heterogeneity. The dependent variable is unexpected investment (Iu_newi,t) cal-
culated adopting Richardson's (2006) method, where over-investing ﬁrms are characterized by positive abnormal invest-
ment (Iu_newi,t). FCFi,t is computed by subtracting the optimal level of cash ﬂow from cash ﬂow from operating activities
(CFO). Blockhoder is the percentage of shares controlled by the largest shareholder. High_Share (Low_Share) is a dummy var-
iable equal to 1 in a given year if the percentage of shares controlled by the blockholder in a given ﬁrm lies in the top (bot-
tom) three deciles of the distribution of the corresponding percentage of all ﬁrms operating in the same industry in that
year, and 0 otherwise. For the remaining ﬁrm–years, the dummy Medium_Share will be equal to 1. In the column labeled
Shareholding_CEO, Insider(Outsider) is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the ﬁrm's CEO is (is not) holding shares
in his/her own company, and 0 otherwise. Diff is the p-value of the Wald statistic for the equality of the free cash ﬂow co-
efﬁcients across various categories of ﬁrms. ** and *** indicate signiﬁcance at the, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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provide further support to the agency costs (AC) hypothesis.277.2.2. Further tests: measuring agency costs using blockholder's and CEO shareholding
To better understand the extent to which agency costs matter for the sensitivity of abnormal investment to free cash ﬂow, in
this section, we verify whether our results are robust to partitioning ﬁrms on the basis of other variables which have been used in
the literature to proxy for the presence of agency problems (Ang et al., 2000; Jiang et al., 2010).
Our ﬁrst alternative measure focuses on the percentage of shares controlled by the largest shareholder (Blockholderi,t). It has
been argued that concentrated ownership is positively associated with ﬁrms' agency costs. As mentioned earlier, agency costs
arising from the conﬂict of interest between the controlling shareholder andminority investors,may become apparentwhen the control-
ling shareholder extracts private beneﬁts fromminority shareholders (tunneling). The ability of the primary owner to expropriateminor-
ity investors is expected to increasewith his/her ownership.When the interests of the controlling shareholder are not alignedwith those
of other investors, there is in fact good reason to believe that the former may use his/her power to inﬂuence the ﬁrm's investment deci-
sions to promote his/her interests at the expense ofminority shareholders. Therefore, a high concentration of ownership at the ﬁrm level
may indicates a strong incentive to tunnel and a high level of agency costs (Liu and Lu, 2007).26 It should be noted, however, that the Wald tests do not reject the equality of the coefﬁcients of free cash ﬂow between ﬁrms with high and low agency costs.
27 Estimating similar regressions on the sample of under-investing ﬁrms delivered similar coefﬁcients across the groups of ﬁrms characterized by different levels of
agency costs. These results, which are not reported for brevity but available on request, conﬁrm that the AC hypothesis is unlikely to hold for under-investing ﬁrms.
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company's operation even by only holding a relatively low stake of shares, through pyramid structures and cross-holding
among ﬁrms. When the primary owner's controlling right is greater than his/her ownership right, he/she tends to derive more
beneﬁts from tunneling activities. Thus, a lower incentive to tunnel, and lower agency costs are expected when the highest per-
centage of shares is held by the primary owner (Jiang et al., 2010). Additionally, investors with a large ownership stake generally
have a strong interest in the ﬁrm's proﬁt maximization and have a higher incentive to oversee or monitor the manager. Hence,
agency costs intended as the conﬂict between ﬁrm managers and shareholders, tend to decline with the ownership stake of con-
trolling shareholders (Ang et al., 2000; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The ownership stake of the controlling shareholder is there-
fore deﬁnitely an important determinant of the overall agency costs faced by the ﬁrm, but whether it affects these agency costs
positively or negatively is ambiguous.
In order to test the extent to which the blockolder's shareholding affects the sensitivity of over-investment to free cash ﬂow,
we construct the dummies Low_sharei,t,Medium_sharei,t, and High_sharei,t, which are in turn equal to 1 if the blockolder's share-
holding of ﬁrm i in year t lies in the bottom three, the middle four, and the top three deciles of the distribution of the corre-
sponding shareholding of all ﬁrms operating in the same industry as ﬁrm i in year t, and 0 otherwise. We then interact these
dummies with free cash ﬂow and examine the coefﬁcients of the interaction terms in our over-investment regressions.
The results are reported in column 1 of Table 10. Interestingly, we observe that the coefﬁcient associated with free cash ﬂow is the
largest for the medium shareholding category. This suggests that, the sensitivity of over-investment to FCF initially increases with the
shares held by the largest shareholder, then decreases.28 These differences between categories can be explained considering that, as pre-
viously discussed, there are arguments both in favor and against a positive relationship between the percentage of shares controlled by
the largest shareholder and agency problems. This ﬁnding is in linewith Jiang et al. (2010), according towhich agency costs indicated by
tunneling are highest when the largest shareholder owns a medium percentage (30%) of the ﬁrm's shares.
Our next measure of agency costs is motivated by international evidence that agency costs may arise when managerial inter-
ests are not in line with those of the ﬁrm's shareholders. Managerial ownership tends to relieve principal–agent problems be-
tween (outside) shareholders and managers. Thus, agency costs arising from the conﬂict of interest between managers and
shareholders should be lower at ﬁrms managed by a shareholder.29 In order to test whether this is the case, we construct a
dummy variable Insideri,t (Outsideri,t), which is equal to one if a ﬁrm is managed by a shareholder (outsider), and 0 otherwise.
Speciﬁcally, if the top executives, including the CEO, are holding any of their own shares, they will be considered as insiders.
We then interact free cash ﬂow with the Insideri,t and Outsideri,t dummies and examine the differences in the coefﬁcients associ-
ated with the two interaction terms in our over-investment regressions.
The results appear in column 2 of Table 10. We observe that only the sensitivity of over-investment to free cash ﬂow of ﬁrms
managed by an outsider is statistically signiﬁcant. This can be explained considering that outside managers may not have closely
aligned interests with the ﬁrm's shareholders and suggests that managerial ownership is negatively associated with the ﬁrm's
principal–agent problems.30 Thus, for over-investing ﬁrms, agency problems between entrenched managers and shareholders
can explain the statistically signiﬁcant sensitivity of over-investment to free cash ﬂow.
In summary, the ﬁndings in Table 10 are strongly aligned with our previous results and hypothesis H2: The sensitivity of
abnormal investment to free cash ﬂow rises with the degree of agency costs faced by over-investing ﬁrms.
8. Conclusions
In this paper, we provide a portrait of the nature and balance of ﬁnancial constraints and agency problems in China, giving a
picture of the extent to which the economy has suffered from efﬁciency losses due to both under- and over-investment. Two
signiﬁcant conclusions emerge from our main ﬁndings: On the one hand, the limited access to capital markets which charac-
terizes many Chinese ﬁrms leads to signiﬁcant under-investment. On the other hand, the weak corporate governance struc-
tures lead managers or controlling shareholders to over-invest their free cash ﬂow in projects with negative NPV.
The identiﬁcation of ﬁnancial constraints and agency problems as explanations for under- and over-investment suggests that
in order to improve investment efﬁciency in China, both the ﬁnancial and the legal system need to be reformed. In particular,
since China's ﬁnancial system is still dominated by under-developed state-owned banks, in order to sustain the rapid growth
of the Chinese economy, especially in the private sector, more widespread access to credit markets should be a priority in
order to increase ﬁrms' investment efﬁciency. In the long run, the establishment of an effective credit-rating system and the de-
velopment of equity ﬁnance could be a way to achieve this target.28 It should also be noted that only the interaction between FCF and the dummy equal to 1 for medium shareholding is statistically signiﬁcant. Yet, the p-values asso-
ciatedwith theWald tests cannot reject the equality of the impact of free cash ﬂow on over-investment between ﬁrms characterized by different percentages of shares
owned by the largest shareholders.
29 This can be explained considering that insidemanagersmayhave interestsmore closely alignedwith theﬁrm's shareholders. Jensen andMeckling (1976) propose a
hypothesis of convergence of interests between shareholders andmanagers, and improvement of corporate performance asmanagerial ownership increases. Kren and
Kerr (1997), Ang et al. (2000), Singh andDavidson III (2003), andMcKnight andWeir (2009) also provide support for the argument thatmanagerial ownership reduces
agency costs.
30 In our sample, there is often separation between management and ownership. In addition, those few managers who are also shareholders in their company only
hold a small percentage of their own shares. Relative low ownership stakes preventmanagers frompursuing their own interests at the expense of shareholders, as they
are supervised and controlled by the board, as well as by capital markets.
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need to be carried out to reduce conﬂicts of interest between controlling shareholders andminority shareholders, and to increase the in-
tensity of monitoring by other shareholders or independent institutions. This is particularly important at the local level. Imposing con-
straints or more restrictive regulations to local government bureaucrats to prevent them from making adverse decisions such as
expropriation and misappropriation of funds, which ultimately lead to over-investment, should therefore be on the political agenda.
Positive steps in both directions have already been taken. With regards to ﬁnancing constraints, the recent reforms to the ﬁnancial
system documented in Borst and Lardy (2015) are likely to have played an important role in making ﬁnance more accessible, to the ex-
tent that Lardy (2014) documents a signiﬁcant increase in the ﬂow of loans to the previously ﬁnancially discriminated against private
sector in recent years. Focusing on agency costs, Cumming et al. (2012) and Hou et al. (2012) argue that the 2005 split share structure
reform, which allowed restricted shares held mainly by state shareholders to become tradable, and permitted equity-based compensa-
tion for executives or directors, enhanced the incentives of controlling state shareholders to monitor managers, ensuring they were dis-
ciplined against opportunistic behavior and refrained from the expropriation of minority shareholders.31
Yet, despite these positive steps, more work needs to be done to completely eradicate investment inefﬁciency from the Chi-
nese economy. To this end, the economic reforms ﬁrst outlined by the Communist Party Central Committee's Third Plenum in
late 2013, and aimed at enhancing the market's role in allocating resources, while making SOEs more efﬁcient, are fundamentally
important. These reforms will enable China to smoothly transit from a fast-growing economy, reliant on (often excessive) invest-
ment in heavy industry and cheap manufacturing exports, to a “new normal” model of development, characterized by better qual-
ity and slower growth (Green and Stern, 2015). This will translate itself into higher efﬁciency, and a move away from heavy-
industrial investment and toward domestic consumption, particularly of services.Acknowledgments
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1. Structure of the panel
Table A1 illustrates the structure of our panel. Table A2 presents the per year distribution of observations in our dataset.Table A1
Structure of the unbalance panel.
No. of obs. per ﬁrm No. of obs. Percent Cumulative
3 279 1.25% 1.25%
4 704 3.15% 4.39%
5 1055 4.72% 9.11%
6 510 2.28% 11.39%
7 840 3.75% 15.14%
8 1024 4.58% 19.72%
9 756 3.38% 23.1%
10 830 3.71% 26.81%
11 1320 5.9% 32.71%
12 1560 6.97% 39.68%
13 1638 7.32% 47%
14 2212 9.89% 56.89%
15 2655 11.87% 68.76%
16 2944 13.16% 81.92%
17 4046 18.08% 100%
Total 22,373 100.00%
31 To provide evidence on the effectiveness of these positive steps in reducing investment inefﬁciency in China, we investigated whether the sensitivities of both
under- and over-investment to free cash ﬂow change before and after 2008. We found a signiﬁcant decline in the sensitivities of under-investment to free cash ﬂow
in the post-2008 period. Yet, these sensitivities remained positive and highly signiﬁcant, which suggest that ﬁnancing constraints did not disappear. As for the sensi-
tivities of over-investment to free cashﬂow, they became insigniﬁcant in the post-2008period. These results are not reported for brevity, but are available upon request.
Table A2
Distribution of ﬁrm–year observations by year.
Year No. of obs. Percent Cumulative
1998 576 2.57% 2.57%
1999 689 3.08% 5.65%
2000 791 3.54% 9.19%
2001 867 3.88% 13.06%
2002 953 4.26% 17.32%
2003 1046 4.68% 22%
2004 1127 5.04% 27.04%
2005 1129 5.05% 32.08%
2006 1165 5.21% 37.29%
2007 1358 6.07% 43.36%
2008 1477 6.6% 49.96%
2009 1554 6.95% 56.91%
2010 1763 7.88% 64.79%
2011 1896 8.47% 73.26%
2012 2026 9.06% 82.32%
2013 2012 8.99% 91.31%
2014 1944 8.69% 100%
Total 22,373 100.00%
Table A3
Dynamic model of investment expenditure.
Dependent variable: I_newi,t (1) (2)
Fixed effects GMM-system
I_newi,t − 1 0.324*** 0.411***
(0.007) (0.030)
Cashi,t − 1 0.103*** 0.098***
(0.004) (0.012)
Qi,t − 1 0.001** 0.000
(0.000) (0.001)
Sizei,t − 1 −0.004*** 0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
Agei,t −0.002 −0.001***
(0.002) (0.000)
ROAi,t − 1 0.082*** 0.121***
(0.006) (0.025)
Leveragei,t − 1 −0.024*** 0.013
(0.004) (0.010)
Year-ﬁxed effects Yes Yes
Industry-ﬁxed effects No Yes
Province-ﬁxed effects No Yes
(Year-ﬁxed) ∗ (Industry-ﬁxed) effects Yes Yes
R2 0.49
Adjusted R2 0.42
ρ 0.33
Prob>F (overall ﬁt) 26.21 17.51
Hansen J test (p-value) 0.13
m3 test (p-value) 0.54
Observations 19,190 19,190
Notes: Estimates in column 1 were obtained using the ﬁxed effects estimator. Estimates in column 2 were obtained using the system GMM estimator. Test statistics
and standard errors (in parentheses) of all variables in the regressions are asymptotically robust to heteroscedasticity. Adopting Richardson's (2006) method, the
dependent variable is I_newi,t, the difference between Itotal and Imain. (see Fig. 1 for deﬁnitions of these variables). All variables except Qi,t − 1, Sizei,t − 1 and Agei,t are
scaled by total assets. For the ﬁxed effects regression, ρ represents the proportion of the total error variance accounted for by unobserved heterogeneity. For the
system GMM regression, m3 is a test for third-order serial correlation of the differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial
correlation. The Hansen J test of over-identifying restrictions is distributed as Chi-square under the null of instrument validity. We treat I_newi,t − 1, Cashi,t − 1,
Qi,t − 1, Size i,t − 1, ROAi,t − 1 and Leveragei,t − 1 as potentially endogenous variables. Levels of these variables dated t − 3 and further are used as instruments in
the ﬁrst-differenced equations and ﬁrst-differences of these same variables lagged twice are used as additional instruments in the level equations. ** and *** in-
dicate signiﬁcance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Market value of assets: sum of market value of tradable stocks, book value of non-tradable stocks, and market value of net debt.
Tobin's Q: ratio of market value of total assets to book value of total assets.
Return on assets (ROA): ratio of net income to total assets.
Leverage: ratio of the sum of short-term and long-term debt to total assets.
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Size: natural logarithm of total assets.
Age: number of years since listing.
Sales growth: rate of growth of real sales.
CAPEX: capital expenditures, i.e. cash paid to acquire and construct ﬁxed assets, intangible assets and other long-term assets.
SalePPE: sale of property, plant and equipment, i.e. net cash received from disposals of ﬁxed assets, intangible assets, and other
long-term assets.
I_total: total investment, i.e. capital expenditure less receipts from sale of property, plant and equipment (CAPEX − SalePPE).
I_main.: investment to maintain existing assets in place (depreciation + amortization).
I_new: total investment less investment to maintain existing assets in place (I_total − I_main.).
Ie_new: expected investment expenditure in new positive NPV projects.
Iu_new: unexpected or abnormal investment expenditure.
CFO: net cash ﬂow from operating activities, i.e. difference between cash inﬂow from operating activities and cash outﬂow
from operating activities.
CFAIP: cash ﬂow generated from assets in place (CFO − I_main.).
FCF: free cash ﬂow (CFO − I_main. − Ie_new).
Deﬂator: The GDP deﬂator, which is obtained from the National Bureau of Statistics of China, is used to convert all variables to
real terms.
Industries: According to the industry classiﬁcation taken from the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), ﬁrms in
China's listed sector are assigned to one of the following twelve industrial sectors: Farming, forestry, animal husbandry & ﬁsh-
ing; Mining; Manufacturing; Utilities; Construction; Transportation & warehouse; Information technology; Wholesale & re-
tailing; Real estate; Social services; Communications & cultural; Conglomerates; Finance and insurance. Following previous
literature, we exclude the Finance & insurance sector from our study.
Provinces: There are 31 provinces in China: Coastal provinces (Beijing, Fujian, Guangdong, Hainan, Hebei, Jiangsu, Liaoning,
Shandong, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Zhejiang); Central provinces (Chongqing, Anhui, Heilongjiang, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangxi,
Jilin, and Shanxi); andWestern provinces (Gansu, Guangxi, Guizhou, Neimenggu, Ningxia, Qinghai, Shaanxi, Sichuan, Xinjiang,
and Yunnan ).
3. Estimates of the dynamic model of investment expenditure (Eq. (1))
Table A3 provides the ﬁxed effects and system Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimates of our dynamic model of in-
vestment expenditure outlined in Eq. (1). It is worth noting that in a dynamic panel setting, the ﬁxed effects estimator suffers
from endogeneity problems. Our preferred estimator is therefore the system GMM developed by Arellano and Bover (1995)
and Blundell and Bond (1998). This estimator enables us to control for the possible endogeneity of the regressors, as well as
for omitted variables bias and ﬁrm-speciﬁc and time-invariant heterogeneity. Lagged values of the independent variables are
used as instruments to control for the potential endogeneity of the regressors (Baum, 2006; Roodman, 2009).
Column 1 reports the ﬁxed effects estimates, which remove the effect of time-invariant ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics. The ρ co-
efﬁcient indicates that around 33% of the total error variance is explained by unobserved heterogeneity. Column 2 presents the
estimates obtained using our preferred system GMM estimator. We treat I_newi,t, Cash i,t, Qi,t, Sizei,t, ROAi,t, and Leveragei,t as poten-
tially endogenous variables and instrument them using their own values lagged 3 to 6 times. First-differences of these same var-
iables lagged twice are used as additional instruments in the level equations.
The system GMM estimate of the coefﬁcient associated with the lagged dependent variable, I_newi,t − 1, is 0.411. This positive
and precisely determined coefﬁcient suggests that investment behavior is sluggish and smooth. In addition, ﬁrms' new investment
expenditure (I_newi,t) goes up following increases in cash holdings and ROA, and declines with age. It is interesting to note that
Tobin's Q exhibits a poorly determined coefﬁcient, while ROA has a positive and precisely determined coefﬁcient. The proﬁtability
of Chinese ﬁrms has therefore a greater impact on their investment than the market valuation on investment. This is consistent
with the ﬁnding from Wang et al. (2009), who show that in inefﬁcient markets like China, higher proﬁts are associated with
higher investment.
In order to evaluate the validity of instruments and the correct speciﬁcation of the model, two diagnostic tests are used in our
GMM estimations. The ﬁrst is the Hansen (J) test for over-identifying restrictions. The second, m(n), tests for the nth order serial
correlation of the differenced residuals, and provides a further test for the validity of the speciﬁcation of the model and the legit-
imacy of instruments. If the m(n) test rejects the null hypothesis, the instruments need to be lagged at least n + 1 times.32 From
column 2 of Table A3, we can see that neither the Hansen J test nor the m(3) test reject the null hypothesis of instrument validity
and/or correct model speciﬁcation.3332 Since ourmodels generally reject the null hypothesis of no second-order autocorrelationwhen the instruments are lagged twice, levels of the endogenous variables
dated t− 3 and further are used as instruments in the ﬁrst-differenced equations, and ﬁrst-differences of the endogenous variables dated t− 2 are used as additional
instruments in the level equations (Baum, 2006; Roodman, 2009).
33 It should be noted, however, that neither the Hansen J test nor them(n) test can distinguish poor speciﬁcation of the model from instrument invalidity.
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